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CHECK PAYMENT: FINALITY UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
by John P. Finan*
M AY A BANK which pays a check by mistake recover the pay-
ment? The answer has traditionally depended upon the
law of restitution as modified to fit the peculiar necessities of the
law of bills and notes.' Such law determines whether payment
may be recovered by balancing the equities between the parties.2
The leading case in this field is Price v. Neal,3 which holds that
if the payor and the person paid are equally innocent, the law
will not shift the loss from one innocent person to another. In
Price the signature of the drawer was forged.
Unlike the Negotiable Instruments Law4 which treated the
problem of finality of payment or acceptance in a fragmentary
manner, the Uniform Commercial Code has provided for the
problem rather exhaustively in §§ 3-417 (1), and 3-418.6 Section
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron College of Law.
1 Restatement of Restitution §§ 30-38 (1941). The Negotiable InstrumentsLaw § 62 (5 U.L.A. § 62) partially codified the rule, and the doctrine of Price
v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 96 Eng. Rep. 221 (1762), was deemed to be in force
under the N.I.L. Britton, Britton on Bills and Notes 380-382 (2d ed. 1961).
A few common law decisions in this country rejected the doctrine of Price
v. Neal and allowed recovery on a showing of mutual mistake. Id. at 379.
2 Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1890). See also
Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-417, Comment 4, 1962 Official Text with Com-
ments. [Hereinafter all Code references, and all section references are to
the 1962 text unless otherwise indicated.]
3 3 Burr. 1354, 96 Eng. Rep. 221 (1762).
4 5 U.L.A. § 62 (1943).
5 § 3-417(1) provides:
"(1) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts
that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title;
and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or draweris unauthorized, except that this warranty is not given by a
holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(Continued on next page)
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3-418 provides that payment or acceptance of any negotiable
instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person
who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on the pay-
ment. There are two exceptions. Payment is not final if a pre-
sentment warranty has been breached7 or if the payor bank may
recover a payment improperly made by returning the item or
sending notice of dishonor within the time limits of § 4-301. Sec-
tions 3-418 and 3-417 (1)8, taken together, codify prior law9 in
those areas where the question of finality is determined by bal-
ancing the equities between the parties. The Article 4 excep-
(Continued from preceding page)
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature,
whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took
the draft after the acceptance or obtained the acceptance
without knowledge that the drawer's signature was un-
authorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that this
warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in good
faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also
the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made
prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course took the
draft after the acceptance, even though the acceptance pro-
vided "payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms;
or;
(iv) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made
after the acceptance."
6 § 3-418 provides:
"Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on
Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except for liability for
breach of warranty on presentment under the preceding section, pay-
ment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in
due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment."
7 Literally, only the warranties of § 3-417(1) are exceptions to finality under
§ 3-418, supra n. 6. The Article 4 exception to finality refers to § 4-301, not
§ 4-207 (1), which is the functional equivalent of § 3-417(1) and which pro-
vides identical warranties in almost identical language for customers and
collecting banks. Despite the literal language, it is inconceivable that§ 4-207(1) would not constitute an exception. See § 4-102(1). See also
Bunn, Bank Deposits under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1964 Wis. L.
Rev. 278 (1964).
8 Reference to § 3-417(1) includes § 4-207(1) where that is the applicable
section.
9 The Code has been enacted in 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) 1968 Supp. p. 9.
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tion' ° codifies the law on accountability of payor banks in the
check collection process. Phrased another way, the first excep-
tion, found in § 3-418, provides that payment is not final if a payor
bank is not accountable for an item."
A bank becomes accountable for a check 2 which is received
otherwise than for immediate payment over the counter, when
it makes an authorized settlement before midnight of the bank-
ing day of receipt and (a) finally pays the check or (b) fails to
return the check or send written notice of dishonor or non-
payment before its midnight deadline. 13 If it makes final pay-
ment, it becomes accountable under § 4-213 (1). And if it fails to
take action within the time prescribed by § 4-301, it becomes
accountable under § 4-302. Three situations are suggested: (A)
Payment may be final under § 3-418 though it is not final under
§ 4-213 (1) ;14 (B) Payment may be final under § 4-213 (1) though
it is not final under § 3-418; 15 and (C) Payment may be final
under both sections.' 6 The last seems redundant; final payment
is final. In fact, no redundancy exists as the word "final" is used
equivocally. Under § 4-213 (1) it is used to distinguish final pay-
ment from provisional payment. Under § 3-418 it deprives a
drawee who has finally paid off a cause of action for the recovery
of payment except as provided by the Code for breach of pre-
sentment warranty.
What is the difference between payment which is final only
under § 4-213(1) and payment which is final under both sec-
tions? If payment is final under both sections, no recovery may
10 § 4-301.
11 §4-104(g). "'Item' means any instrument for the payment of money
even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."
12 § 3-104(2) (b). A check is a negotiable instrument drawn on a bank and
payable on demand.
13 §§ 4-301 (1), 4-302. See also § 4-104(h) for definition of "midnight dead-
line."
14 If the payor bank, though it has not finally paid an item under § 4-213(1),
becomes accountable under §§ 4-301 and 4-302, and there is no breach of
presentment warranty, payment is final by the terms of § 3-418.
15 If an item is finally paid under § 4-213 to a person who is neither a hold-
er in due course nor a person who has in good faith changed his position
in reliance on payment, payment is not final under § 3-418. (Absent breach
of presentment warranty, it may be final under supplementary principles of
law and equity.)
16 If final payment under § 4-213 is made to a holder in due course or a
person who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on payment,
it is final under § 4-213 (1) and § 3-418.
Spring, 1968
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be had by a bank except as specifically provided by the Code. 7
If payment is final only under § 4-213 (1) however, resort may be
had not only to the breach of warranty provisions of the Code,
but also to supplementary principles of law and equity.18
Returning to the principal problem of this paper-recovery
of payment once a payor bank has become accountable-§ 3-418,
comment one, provides that "[t]he section follows the rule of
Price v. Neal . .. under which a drawee who accepts or pays an
instrument on which the signature of the drawer is forged is
bound on his acceptance and cannot recover back his payment."
The rule of Price v. Neal"' has frequently been subject to attack
and suffers from the lack of an acceptable rationale. 19 Two
rationales are suggested in comment 1 to § 3-418. The comment
states that "[t]he traditional justification for the result is that
the drawee is in a superior position to detect a forgery because
he has the maker's signature and is expected to know and com-
pare it; . . ." This reasoning is not persuasive. Even if the for-
gery were so expert that no bank employee could reasonably be
expected to tell the difference between it and the true signature,
the rule would still apply. The drafter of the Comment appar-
ently recognized the weakness of the rationale by suggesting that
dc '**a less fictional rationalization is that it is highly desirable
to end the transaction on an instrument when it is paid rather
than reopen the same and upset a series of commercial transac-
tions at a later date when the forgery is discovered." 20 (Em-
phasis added.) The second rationale, whatever else its merits,
suffers from being inconsistent with the Code's rule that a payor
bank may recover for breach of warranty if it has paid over a
forged endorsement. 21 It is singular that comment 3 to § 3-417
justifies the distinction between forgery of a drawer's signature
17 According to the 1956 Recommendation of the Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code § 4-209 at 146, the deletion from § 3-417 of a
warranty of no knowledge of any effective direction to stop payment evi-
dences no intent to change the common law insofar as there are common
law decisions on the subject. Does this mean that despite final payment
under § 4-213(1) to a holder in due course or other party protected under
3-418, the person paid might be liable in an action by the bank to recover
payment, although no presentment warranty under the Code were breached?
If so, this casts doubt on meaning of the word "final" in § 3-418.
1s 2 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code, at 310-317 [1072-1079] (1955).
1sa 3 Burr. 1354, 96 Eng. Rep. 221 (1762).
19 Britton supra n. 1 at 377.
20 § 3-418, Comment 1.
21 § 3-417 (1) (a), § 4-207 (1) (a).
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and forgery of an endorsement on the basis that the ". . . drawee
is in a position to verify the drawer's signature by comparison
with one in his hands, but has ordinarily no opportunity to verify
an endorsement." It would have been more enlightening if the
comment suggested how these provisions could be distinguished
on the basis of the "less fictionalized" rationale.
The Code balances the equities2 2 between persons who ob-
tain payment or acceptance and prior transferors on the one hand
and payors on the other by the use of warranties and provides
that any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any
prior transferor warrants to the payor bank that he has no ac-
tual23 knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is
unauthorized. 24 According to prior law, one who at the time of
payment suspected, or had reason to know of the mistake of the
payor, was subject to an action of restitution.25 This constituted
an "exception" 26 to the rule of Price v. Neal and is consistent
with the rationale of that case, for while there is no reason to
shift the loss from one innocent man to another, there is reason
to place the loss upon one who either knew or had reason to
know that the signature was forged.
The Code position, however, is that the person who obtains
payment or acceptance has equities equal or superior to the bank
which pays on a forged order unless the person paid has actual
knowledge of the forgery. This position is objectionable in that
it fails to recognize that a person paid who suspects or has reason
to know of the mistake has less equities than a payor who is
without fault or whose fault is at most constructive. But even
this warranty, limited as it is, is weakened by complex excep-
tions which reflect a poor policy choice.
The Code provides that the warranty given in § 3-417(1)
22 § 3-417, Comment 4.
23 1-201 (25) "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has
actual knowledge of it."
24 See text of statute supra n. 5.
25 Restatement of Restitution § 34b (1941).
26 "The doctrine of Price v. Neal is not available to a holder who (1) is
guilty of bad faith, or (2) has been negligent." First Nat. Bank v. United
States Nat. Bank, 100 Or. 264, 197 Pac. 547 at 551 (1921). Negligence in
taking the instrument or bad faith in obtaining payment will be referred
to hereinafter as "exceptions" to the rule of Price v. Neal, but it is probably
more accurate to say that the rule itself has no application to those whose
equities have been diminished by bad faith or negligence when such equi-
ties are being compared to a payor bank whose only "fault" is constructive.
Ibid.
Spring, 1968
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(b) 27 is not given by a holder in due course to a maker with re-
spect to the maker's own signature, nor to a drawer with respect
to the drawer's own signature, whether or not the drawer is also
the drawee.28 Prior law afforded equal treatment to a party who
paid over his own forged signature and a drawee who paid a bill
on which the drawer's signature was forged.2 9 In both cases the
rule of Price v. Neal applied, and in both instances the "excep-
tions" to that rule applied.30 The drafters of the Code, for reasons
which are not explained, have made a distinction between
drawees who are not drawers on the one hand and makers and
drawers on the other. How the fact that the drawee is also the
drawer changes the equities between the parties is not apparent.
Certainly no distinction can be made on the basis of the Code's
explicit rationale for the rule in Price v. Neal. A drawer, wheth-
er or not he is also the drawee, has no greater opportunity to
verify the signature of the drawer than a drawee who is not the
drawer; and the desirability of finality of payment seems equal
in both cases. One might surmise that the drafters thought that
the situations listed in § 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) represented
greater folly on the part of the payor. Certainly makers and
drawers should know their own signatures. Frequently, how-
ever, makers and drawers who have made the mistake denounced
in § 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) are large institutions, or even the
United States Government 3' (to which the Code probably ap-
plies) ,32 and although such institutions may be faulted for not
27 See text accompanying n. 5 supra.
28 My criticism of §§ 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) does not apply to (iii) in that
an acceptor of a draft is liable under § 3-413 to a holder in due course who
took the draft after the acceptance. This rule of § 3-413 seems desirable
when the holder in due course relies on the acceptance. But see Britton,
Defenses, Claims of Ownership and Equities, 7 Hastings L. J. at 39 and 40
(1955). The rule of § 3-417(1) (b) (iii) is clearly right, since it would be
ludicrous to give a person a right to obtain payment, and then allow recov-
ery. Section 3-417(1) (b) (iii) also protects a holder in due course who ob-
tains the acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's signature is un-
authorized. Section 3-413 also protects such holder. Whether or not this is
wise (see Britton, supra), it is necessary to make payment final as to such
holder, since he has a right to demand payment under § 3-413.
29 Restatement of Restitution § 30 (1941).
50 Id. at § 34(b).
B1 See Hartsman v. Henshaw, 11 How. 177 (1854); F. Beutel, Beutel's Bran-
nan Negotiable Instruments Law, § 62 at 906-907 (7th ed. 1948).
32 Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1943), holds that
the rights of the United States on Commercial paper which it issues are
governed by federal common law and not local law under Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). In New York, N. H. and H. R.
(Continued on next page)
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setting up internal mechanisms to detect forgery, it is not evident
why they should be forced to be more efficient in their internal
control mechanisms than a drawee who is not also the drawer.
Furthermore, as comment 4 to § 3-417 points out, ". . . one
who presents an instrument knowing that the signature of the
maker or drawer is forged or unauthorized commits an obvious
fraud upon the party to whom the presentment is made." That
same comment recognizes that subsection 1 (b) is dealing with
competing equities of parties accepting or paying instruments
bearing unauthorized makers' or drawers' signatures. I submit
that the folly of the party who pays does not deprive him of equi-
ties superior to one who has committed an obvious fraud.
In order to be excused from the warranties of § 3-417(1) (b)
the holder in due course must act in good faith. This qualification
adds an enigma to a section which is already undesirable on
policy grounds. Good faith is defined by the Code as "honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 3 How may one
with actual knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer
is a forgery act in good faith in obtaining payment to which he
has no right? Such action coupled with such knowledge is in-
compatible with honesty. And yet the courts in interpreting this
section will be faced with a dilemma. If they hold that good faith
is incompatible with knowledge, §§ 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) will
be rendered surplusage; for the warranty is not breached unless
there is knowledge and the exceptions do not apply unless there
is good faith. If they hold that good faith is not compatible with
knowledge, they will violate the basic rule of statutory construc-
tion that every word in a statute must be given a meaning, and
that no language must be considered surplusage.3 4 They may
avoid the dilemma by noting that maxims of statutory construc-
tion do not decide cases,3 5 and that this maxim does not apply if
(Continued from preceding page)
Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1950) Judge
Learned Hand said: "[T]he Negotiable Instruments Law has been enacted
in every state of the Union [UCC in 49 states] as well as the District of Co-
lumbia; it is a source of 'federal law'-however that phrase may be con-
strued-more complete and more certain, than any other which can con-
ceivably be drawn from those sources of 'general law' to which we were
accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v. Tyson."
33 § 1-201(10).
34 2 J. Sutherland Statutory Construction § 4705 at 339 (3rd ed. 1943). 46
P.A. § 551.
35 K. N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 520(1960). See also Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 529, 530 (1947).
Spring, 1968
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the words in question are the result of an obvious mistake or
error.36 There is authority under the Code that when a statute
leads to an absurdity, even its plain meaning will be rejected.37
Perhaps the courts will decide that §§ 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and (ii)
and the functionally equivalent §§ 4-207 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) are
the products of mistakes.
Professor Mellinkoff asserts that "... [T]he UCC is a slip-
shod job of draftsmanship." 38 In the catalog of drafting misfor-
tunes which he cites to support this assertion he mentions the
problem we are discussing. He asks how a party paid ". . . may
walk up to the pay window with a black conscience ... and still
be acting in good faith. .... ,, 39 He concludes that this is an "un-
explained mystery," stating:
"Nestled in the protective camouflage of a 245-word
sentence, holder in due course acting in good faith may be
unobtrusive enough. Flushed out it amounts to doubletalk.
The time for rationalizing the language was in the drafting
stage." 40
Professor Mellinkoff sees the instant problem as one of drafts-
manship. Certainly it is that, but the law which this draftsman-
ship enacts is the product of a policy choice.
According to § 3-417, comment 4, although an obvious fraud
is committed when the party obtaining payment or acceptance
has knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is un-
authorized, this simple fact situation is presented in only a few
cases. The draftsman of the comment argues that
".. . [i]f the signature of the maker or drawer has been
forged, the parties include the dishonest forger himself, and
usually one or more innocent holders taking from him. Fre-
quently the state of knowledge of a holder is difficult to de-
termine and sometimes a holder takes such a forged instru-
ment in perfect good faith but subsequently learns of the
forgery. Since in different fact situations holders have equi-
ties of varying strength, it is necessary to have some excep-
tions to the basic warranty."
36 Sutherland, supra n. 34, at § 4705.
37 Roto-Lith Ltd. v. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). In con-
struing § 2-207 the court inferred that acceptance of an offer was condi-
tional and concluded that acceptance was expressly made conditional since
otherwise "the statute would lead to an absurdity." The court suggested
that "the statute is not too happily drafted."
38 Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L. J.
185 (1967).
39 Id. at 219.
40 Id. at 220.
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This explanation is hardly convincing. The Code protects a hold-
er in due course even if it can be proved beyond a shadow of a
doubt that he had knowledge that the signature of the maker or
drawer was unauthorized at the time payment was obtained; or
at the time of transfer in the case of a prior transferor. The ob-
jective stated in the comment could have been achieved by plac-
ing on the maker or the drawer the burden of proving the knowl-
edge of the holder in due course who obtained payment. The
Code could have required clear and convincing evidence or even,
if its policy was strong enough, the criminal standard-proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The Code is clear, however, that degree
of proof has nothing to do with the matter. The only limitation
is good faith, and good faith has nothing to do with the amount
of proof available to show knowledge. In any event, the com-
ment 41 does not restrict itself to considering standards of proof.
It suggests that, under some circumstances at least, a holder in
due course with actual knowledge of a forgery may obtain pay-
ment, and yet possess equities which are equal or superior to the
payor's. It does not explain its suggestion. Such a holder in due
course commits an "obvious fraud" and there is nothing in the
comment suggesting a fact situation, of any complexity, which
would shift the equities so as to favor the perpetrator of such a
fraud. Despite the comment, the rationale for assuming that a
fraudulent presentor may have equal or superior equities to the
payor is not apparent. Even if we could conjure up a fact situ-
ation so complex that the equities would be as suggested by the
Code comment, it would constitute no justification for the policy
choice the Code has made. For §§ 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) are not
limited to such obscure situations. The comment may, however,
offer a way out of the dilemma posed above. A court may find
that, in any given fact situation, good faith is incompatible with
knowledge and yet preserve a function for §§ 3-417 (1) (b) (i) and
(ii) by suggesting that these provisions apply in some obscurely
complex fact situation which has not as yet been presented to the
court. A more forthright approach would be to define knowledge
objectively. The Code defines knowledge as actual knowledge
(a subjective test) but this definition is subject to the proviso
".... unless the context otherwise requires . ,, 42 Taking advan-
tage of this proviso and defining knowledge objectively would
41 § 3-417, Comment 4.
42 § 1-201.
Spring, 1968
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permit a court to avoid the absurd holding that fraud is com-
patible with good faith, and still provide a function for §§ 3-417(1) (b) (i) and (ii), which would apply in those instances where
a holder in due course obtained payment with reason to know
but no actual knowledge that the signature of the maker or
drawer was unauthorized. Thus an objective definition would
remove the objection that §§ 3-417(1) (b) (i) and (ii) would be
rendered surplusage by a finding that fraud and good faith are
incompatible. An incidental benefit of an objective definition, in
my opinion, would be a fairer balancing of the equities between
the payor and person paid.
In addition to the warranty just discussed and the warranty
of title, the Code also provides another exception to finality of
payment in § 3-417 (1): "Any person who obtains payment or
acceptance and any prior transferor warrants to a person who in
good faith pays or accepts that . . . (c) the instrument has not
been materially altered. . . ." This warranty is also subject to
exceptions. It is not given
"... by a holder in due course acting in good faith (i) to the
maker of a note; or (ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or
not the drawer is also the drawee; or (iii) to the acceptor of
a draft with respect to an alteration made prior to the accept-
ance if the holder in due course took the draft after the
acceptance, even though the acceptance provided 'payable
as originally drawn' or equivalent terms; or (iv) to the
acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made after
the acceptance." 43
The basic exceptions seem sound. If one is to determine
finality of payment on the basis of balancing the equities in this
area, as well as in the area of a forged order, 44 it is arguable that
43 § 3-417 (1) (c).
44 In answering the question how far the exceptional rule of Price v. Neal,
as codified in a fragmentary manner by § 62 of the N.I.L. (5 ULA § 62),
may be carried by analogy, Professor Britton includes among "actualities
and possibilities" erasure of a genuine signature and substitution of a for-gery and the filling in of words and figures in blank spaces. There is au-thority that at common law the analogy to the rule of Price v. Neal washeld inapplicable to rights of a drawee to recover on a materially alteredinstrument. However where ". . . a bill was drawn upon the drawer a pay-
ment thereof was not recoverable on the grounds of estoppel." Britton,Britton on Bills and Notes 399 (2d ed. 1961). United States v. National Ex-
change Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 46 S. Ct. 388 (1926), is cited by Brit-ton (Id. note 2), for the proposition that ". . . the paying drawer-drawee
could not recover money paid out on a raised check because the payor wasdeemed to know the amount for which the check was drawn, .... " Compare
this with the rationale for Price v. Neal that the drawee is in a superior
position to detect the forgery.
10
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a holder in due course who obtains payment (or a prior trans-
feror) has equities equal or superior to the maker of a note, the
drawer of a draft, or an acceptor covered by § 3-417 (1) (c) (iv) ,45
who arguably should know the instrument was altered. In these
cases, unlike those where the order has been forged, the skill of
the person making the alteration can never make the altered
item conform to the records kept by the issuer of the instrument.
This rule puts a severe strain on large organizations, but a policy
to encourage them to be cautious in their cashing practices does
not seem unwarranted. What, however, happens if the holder in
due course has actual knowledge that the instrument has been
materially altered? If one looks at this as an initial proposition,
it would seem clear that the exceptions to the warranty do not
apply, since their applicability is dependent upon the holder in
due course acting in good faith. The meaning of the term "good
faith," however, is obscured by its use in § 3-417 (1) (b), dis-
cussed above. I submit that even if a court should find that good
faith is compatible with knowledge that the signature of the
maker or drawer is unauthorized, such a finding of compatibility
ought not to be applied beyond the limited situation which has
given rise to it. Clearly, § 3-417 (1) (c) does not require a holding
that good faith be compatible with guilty knowledge. The excep-
tions to the warranty against material alterations are not surplus-
age even though we find incompatibility. They apply in those
situations where the instrument has been materially altered, but
the holder in due course has no knowledge of the alteration.
Section 3-417 (1) (c) (iii) presents a serious problem. The
Code has a basic policy of freedom of contract.46 Yet in that
section the provision "payable as originally drawn" and equiv-
alent terms are stripped of meaning. An example will illustrate
the problem presented.
Assume that a bank has certified a check which was altered
prior to certification and that a holder in due course takes the
check after certification. The certifying bank is liable to pay the
instrument according to its tenor at the time of its engagement.
47
45 Section 3-417(1) (c) (iii) is clearly justified since the party protected had,
prior to payment, a contractual right to payment (§ 3-413(1)) according to
the tenor of the instrument at the time of acceptance. But see discussion,
infra, concerning contractual limitations.
46 §§1-102(2) and (3).
47 Section 3-413(1) provides that "... [an] acceptor [certification of a check
is acceptance, § 3-411 (1)] engages that he will pay the instrument according
to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to sec-
tion 3-115 on incomplete instruments."
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Assuming that the check was for $1,000 and was raised to $10,000,
the bank would be liable to pay $10,000. Furthermore, payment
would be final in favor of a holder in due course, even if the
holder in due course had actual knowledge at the time he ob-
tained payment that the check was altered.48 (Of course, he
could have no such knowledge when he took the check; other-
wise he would not be a holder in due course.) What happens if
the accepting bank has certified the check "payable as originally
drawn"? Once the check has been paid, the Code makes payment
final in the altered amount despite this language. Why is the
language given no effect? Comment 5 to § 3-417 explains that
"... certifying checks 'payable as originally drawn' leaves the
subsequent purchaser in uncertainty as to the amount for which
the instrument is certified and so defeats the entire purpose of
certification, which is to obtain the definite obligation of the bank
to honor a definite instrument." This rationale hardly seems
consistent with the Code's stated policy in § 1-102 (1) (b)
"... to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties." If checks
certified "payable as originally drawn" should prove commercial-
ly unacceptable, presumably economic compulsion would cause
deletion of the offending phrase. Why a code should decide, apriori, that under no circumstances should such a clause be effec-
tive is unclear. It is especially unclear in view of the general
policy of the Code expressed in § 1-102 (3) that "[t]he effect of
provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, . . ." It is also
inconsistent with the omission from § 3-413 (1) of any limitation
on freedom of contract. The result of this omission is that a cer-
tifying bank may limit its engagement under § 1-102 (3). Apart
from policy problems, this limitation on freedom of contract also
raises an issue in the interpretation of the words "good faith" in
§ 3-417 (1) (c).
One with knowledge of a material alteration may act in goodfaith in obtaining payment in the altered amount if he has a right
to such payment, and such a right is granted under § 3-413. But
what if a check is certified "payable as originally drawn"?
Section 3-413 is subject to § 1-102 (3), which gives effect to such
contractual limitations. Thus, if a bank certifies "payable as
48 Such a holder would be acting in good faith, since the bank is under an
obligation (§3-413(1)) to pay regardless of the alteration, and henceknowledge is immaterial. Restatement of Restitution § 34(b) (1941).
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originally drawn," such a bank is presumably liable only accord-
ing to the original tenor of the item; in our hypothetical example,
$1,000. It follows that if a holder in due course of a certified
check acquires knowledge that it is altered, and it was certified
"payable as originally drawn," such a holder acts in bad faith
in obtaining payment in accordance with the altered tenor. The
distinction drawn between the effect of the language "payable
as originally drawn" or its equivalent in §§ 3-413 and 3-417 (1)
(c) (iii) is anomalous, and one is tempted to try to find a solution
by imposing on §3-413 the limitations on contractual freedom
found in § 3-417 (1) (c) (iii). However, the wording of the statute
is clear on this point, and no compelling reason is manifest why
the language of the Code should be departed from.
It has been seen that the Code gives special protection to
holders in due course both in §§ 3-417 (1) (b) and (c) and in
§ 3-418. This use of the holder-in-due-course concept is subject
to criticism. 49 In an article on the doctrine of Price v. Neal,
50
Professor Aigler states that the protection of holders in due
course has policy roots which are similar to the basis of giving
protection to bona fide purchasers of property in other situations.
According to another recognized authority,5 1 the ordinary reason
for giving protection to a holder in due course, the facilitation of
the free circulation of commercial instruments, is not applicable
to the doctrine of Price v. Neal.
"[S]ince even a holder in due course cannot enforce a
forged instrument, he should not necessarily be able to re-
tain a payment made on such an instrument. He must show
a greater claim to protection than the ordinary policy favor-
ing free circulation of a commercial instrument which pro-
tects negligent purchases of genuine paper. He must show
a meritoriousness greater than that of the ordinary holder
in due course in order to make the equities equal as between
himself and the drawee bank." 52
Professor Aigler agrees: . . . "[I]n determining whether a drawee
shall be allowed to recover back money paid on a forged order
the whole problem is one of equitable relief, often invoking a
49 Britton, supra n. 1, at 386; N.Y. Law Revision Commission Report supra
n. 18, at 313, 314 [1075, 1076].
50 Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 809 at 825 (1926).
51 F. Beutel, Beutel's Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law, § 62 at 915 (7th
ed. 1948).
52 Ibid.
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delicate weighing of equitable considerations on each side." 53
Early drafts of the Code recognized the inappropriateness of the
holder-in-due-course concept in the context of finality of pay-
ment. It was provided54 that acceptance or payment was to be
final ". . . to the extent that any party has paid for the instrument
in good faith." Later the Code accepted the holder-in-due-course
standard.
Are there any exceptions to the rule that payment is final in
favor of holders in due course? At common law there were two
exceptions, negligence and bad faith. The negligence exception
has been abrogated to the extent that the Code applies. Accord-
ing to comment 4 to § 3-418: "[t]he section rejects decisions ...
permitting recovery on the basis of mere negligence of the holder
in taking the instrument." What of other exceptions to the rule
of Price v. Neal? What of the exception that if the party paid
acts in bad faith he must disgorge his gain?
The fact situation in Illustration 2, Restatement of Restitu-
tion, § 34 illustrates this problem.
"A receives a check from B drawn on the C bank, being told
by B that he does not have enough in the bank to cover it
but that he hopes to have a sufficient amount in a few days.
A immediately takes the check to the C bank, which pays it,
the paying teller, as A suspects, mistakenly believing that
B's account is sufficient to cover the check."
Under the Restatement, C is entitled to restitution from A be-
cause of A's fraudulent non-disclosure. Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, is C entitled to restitution from A, if A is a holder
in due course? Presumably not, if we read the language of the
Code literally. Section 3-418 makes payment final; the only ex-
ception allowed is breach of presentment warranty under § 3-417
(1), and there is no such breach.
In developing the law with respect to finality of payment, the
Code drafters had to make a choice between competing equities.
It seems that making payment final in this instance was a poor
choice. Section 3-418 uses general language. Obviously the
drafters of the Code could not have every situation in mind. Is
it possible that if they had considered this particular situation,
they would have decided in a manner contrary to the dictates of
the literal language of the Act? And would a court depart from
53 Aigler, supra n. 50, at 825.
54 § 512 of the proposed final drafts #2, 1948.
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the literal language in order to give effect to such a decision?
Possibly yes,55 but it is not necessary to resort to inference to
preserve the bad faith defense to the doctrine of Price v. Neal.
Section 1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or en-
forcement." A holder in due course obtaining payment has cer-
tain duties; among these are the duties imposed by § 3-417. What-
ever other duties may be imposed on one obtaining payment, the
Code is explicit that an obligation of good faith is included. That
obligation means "honesty in fact" 5" and, in the hypothetical
example we are discussing5 7 the person paid acted dishonestly.
Reading the good faith requirement into § 3-418, payment is not
made final by that section, and since there is no breach of war-
ranty under § 3-417 (1), we must resort to supplementary prin-
ciples of law and equity.58 These principles include the law of
restitution developed under non-Code law, specifically the special
rules for bills and notes which modify the basic rules of restitu-
tion. And under such rules, payment is not final in favor of a
holder in due course who has acted in bad faith in obtaining
payment.5 9
The above analysis assumes that supplementary principles of
law and equity apply. Section 1-103 dictates that they should,
but caution is suggested by an examination of prior cases under
uniform acts, many of which have ignored express provisions
55 Section 62 of the N.I.L. was received as a legislative affirmation of the
rule of Price v. Neal, even though, by its terms, it only applied to acceptance
and not to payment. Some courts extended it to payment and others decided
that finality of payment was a casus omissus and applied the common law.
What happened to the exceptions to the rule of Price v. Neal to the extent
that § 62 was applied? § 62 N.I.L. was by its terms absolute: "The acceptor by
accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of
his acceptance; and admits-1. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness
of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument ......
Nevertheless, the courts preserved the exceptions, reasoning that "it is in-
conceivable that the framers of the act designed to make § 62 absolute and
free from the exceptions which had been previously recognized." First Nat.
Bank v. United States Nat. Bank 100 Or. 264, 197 P. 547, 553 (1921). It was
reasoned that just as the courts adopted Price v. Neal with its exceptions,
so did the legislature, although the exceptions were not expressed. Ibid.
Since the UCC explicitly follows the rule of Price v. Neal (§ 3-418 Com-
ment 1), it is certainly arguable that abrogation of exceptions, though abso-
lute in terms, was not intended, at least with regard to the good faith ex-
ception. See § 1-203.
56 § 1-201 (19).
57 Illustration 2, Restatement of Restitution § 34 (1941).
58 § 1-103.
59 Restatement of Restitution § 34 (b) (1941).
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requiring application of supplementary principles of law and
equity and have decided that the statutory scheme was exhaus-
tive. "Where common-law principles, associated with the subject
matter with which a statute deals, are not expressly affirmed or
denied, the extent to which the common law is altered or changed
is left to implication." 00 One reason for deciding that a statute is
not exhaustive, even if comprehensive, is that the drafters cannot
anticipate in advance every situation which may be affected by
the statute. A typical case involved a delegation of broad powers
to an administrative agency to prescribe the warning signals and
the safety devices at railroad crossings. Initially it was held that
compliance with the regulations released the railroad from com-
mon law negligence. A few years later the court reversed itself
in line with the weight of authority.0 1 "Similar difficulty has
been experienced with reference to uniform state laws, and de-
spite express provisions requiring cases not within the language
of the statute to be governed by the common law." 62 The prob-
lem with reference to uniform state laws can be illustrated by
contrasting two cases decided under the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Act.
The first of these cases is Howard National Bank and Trust
Co. v. Newman,63 which holds that a person secondarily liable
on an instrument is not discharged by release of the principal
debtor on the instrument, if the person secondarily liable con-
sents to the release. The court reached this result, despite N.I.L.
§ 120(5) which provides that release of the principal debtor dis-
charges persons secondarily liable ". . . unless the holder's right
of recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly re-
served. . . ." Such language as "unless the party secondarily
liable consents to the release" is omitted from N.I.L. § 120(5),
but the court preserved the common law effect of consent. It
reasoned that although some courts have held that §§ 119 and
120 N.I.L. 64 are exclusive on the question of the discharge of
negotiable instruments, some force and effect must be given to
N.I.L. § 196, which provides for the application of supplementary
60 3 J. Sutherland Statutory Construction § 5305 at 12 (3rd ed. 1943).
61 Id. at 14, 15.
62 Id. at 15, 16.
63 115 Vt. 61, 50 A.2d 896 (1947).
64 N.I.L. §§ 119 and 120 are the provisions on discharge. Section 119 deals
with discharging a negotiable instrument, and § 120, with discharging per-
sons secondarily liable on the instrument.
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 1 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol1/iss2/2
2 AKRON LAW REVIEW (1)
principles of law and equity unless displaced by the provisions of
this Act. 5 Cellers v. Meachem,°6 on the other hand, decided that
§ 119 of the N.I.L. provides the exclusive method of discharging
primary parties. It held that an extension of the time of payment
granted to the principal debtor without the consent of the surety-
co-maker, did not discharge the surety despite the common law
to the contrary. The Cellers court relied on the maxim, "What
is expressed in an Act is exclusive when it is creative or in dero-
gation of some existing law or of some of the provisions of a par-
ticular Act." 6T The court also relied upon the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. It is submitted that neither these
maxims nor § 196 of the N.I.L. is dispositive. If the subject mat-
ter of the statute is discharge of a primary party who is also the
principal debtor by discharge of the instrument, then clearly the
common law applies.68 If, however, the subject matter of the
statute is discharge of any party primarily liable on a negotiable
instrument whether or not such party is the principal debtor, and
whether or not the instrument is discharged, then the common
law is abrogated under both maxims quoted by the Cellers court
and also by the provisions of Section 196 of the Negotiable In-
struments Law. Neither N.I.L. § 196 nor the quoted maxims de-
fine the subject matter of the statute.
A similar question arises under § 1-103 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which provides: "Unless displaced by the par-
ticular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity...
shall supplement its provisions." If the principles of law and
equity we are talking about are all the principles relating to the
law of finality of payment and acceptance, then the Uniform
Commercial Code is exhaustive and the common law is abro-
gated. If "principles of law and equity" is defined more nar-
rowly to include only those principles relating to finality of pay-
ment when payment is made to a holder in due course or a per-
son who has, in good faith, changed his position in reliance on
payment, plus the law and equity pertaining to those fact situ-
ations which would give rise to a breach of presentment war-
ranty under the Code, then the Code is not exhaustive.
65 Section 196 N.I.L. provides that "In any case not provided for in this act
the rules of [law and equity including] the law merchant shall govern.
66 Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Or. 227, 89 Pac. 426 (1907).
67 Id. at 428.
68 Britton, supra n. 1, at 701-02, argues for the application of the common
law: "The discharge of a primary party who is also a surety is thus un-
touched by the Negotiable Instruments Law."
Spring, 1968
17
Finan: Check Payment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1968
CHECK PAYMENT
In 1960, a commentator on the UCC stated that "[s]ections
3-417 (1) and 3-418, operating together, seem to eliminate rights
of payors and acceptors based on quasi-contract and to limit their
rights of recovery to theories of warranty." 69 Did he mean that
rights of payors and acceptors based on quasi-contract were elim-
inated with respect to all payments and acceptances based on
mistake of fact, or is his statement limited to those areas specifi-
cally covered by the Code? Two examples will aid in exploring
this problem. Example one involves a holder in due course who
is negligent in taking an instrument. He obtains payment with
no knowledge that the signature of the maker has been forged,
and now the payor seeks recovery on the theory of quasi-
contract. Under pre-code law it is clear, at least in many juris-
dictions, that the payor would have recovered because of the
holder's negligence. However, the Code says that payment is
final, and that the only exceptions to finality are the warranties
in § 3-417 (1) and possibly lack of good faith.70 Neither is found
here, so payment certainly seems final.
Example 2 involves a holder who takes an instrument in
good faith. He is not a holder in due course for the perfectly
innocuous reason that he took a demand instrument 31 days after
its issuance.7'1 It is clear that if such a person is not a holder in
due course, and is not a person who has in good faith changed
his position in reliance on payment, he is not protected by § 3-418.
However, assuming no breach of warranty under § 3-417 (1), the
Code does not apply, and it seems clear that under Article One,
§ 1-103, there will be resort to general principles of law and
equity. According to these principles, if the holder acted in good
faith in obtaining payment and was not negligent in taking the
instrument, restitution will not be allowed; the payment is final.
Under familiar principles of statutory construction it might
be argued that since payment is not made final under § 3-418, it
69 R. Steinheimer, Michigan Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code 115 (1960).
70 See discussion supra concerning the preservation of the good faith ex-
ception to the rule of Price v. Neal.
71 To be a holder in due course, a holder must take without notice that it
is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it
on the part of any person. § 3-302. Under § 3-304(3) "... a purchaser has
notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reason to know (c) that he
is taking a demand instrument . . . more than a reasonable length of time
after its issue. A reasonable time for a check drawn and payable within the
states and territories of the United States and District of Columbia is pre-
sumed to be thirty days."
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is by implication not final. 72 This conclusion is unacceptable. If
payment is not final, what is the basis of the payor's recovery?
There is no breach of presentment warranty under § 3-417 (1) and
if he resorts to common law, that law decrees that payment is
final. Furthermore, under the same principles of statutory con-
struction, it might also be suggested that whenever there is no
breach of presentment warranty under § 3-417(1), payment is
final. This interpretation must also be rejected. Not only would
it render § 3-418 surplusage, but it would make payment final in
many instances where the equities clearly suggest recovery. 73
Furthermore, the Code is explicit that "the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative . . . to
mistake . . . shall, supplement its provision." 74 According to
§ 1-103, comment 1, ". . . all supplemental bodies of law except
insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this Act" remain ap-
plicable to commercial contracts. Certainly in those areas not
covered by either § 3-417 (1) or § 3-418 there is no explicit dis-
placement, and courts should be cautious about drawing negative
implications in light of the requirement of § 1-103 requiring "par-
ticular provisions" to displace the common law. Furthermore, as
is clear from the above discussion, the negative implications can-
cel each other out.
Another facet of the problem respecting the applicability of
supplementary principles of law and equity involves the question
whether payors have a duty of acting equitably in giving notice
of breach of warranty within a reasonable time after discovering
it. Section 3-417 imposes no such burden. Indeed it is suggested
that:
"The inclusion in article 4 of the Code of a requirement
that a claim for breach of warranty be made within a rea-
sonable time on penalty of discharge of liability to the extent
of any loss caused by the delay, coupled with the omission
of such a requirement from article 3, [§ 3-417] would seem
to preclude a court from imposing the requirement by the
application of equitable principles." 75
72 Section 3-418 comment 3 has language supporting this negative inference:
"If he [the holder] has taken the instrument in bad faith or with notice[which includes taking the instrument 31 days after issue, § 3-304(3) (c)] hehas no equities as against the drawee." See also Britton, supra n. 1, at 383-
384.
73 For example, such a negative implication makes payment final if a bad
faith purchaser procured payment, provided only that bad faith does not
include a breach of a presentment warranty under the Code.
74 § 1-103.
75 17 Stan. L. Rev. 77, 83 (1964).
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Why should a court be so precluded? Apparently because the
omission from one section of that which is included in a function-
ally equivalent section shows by implication a legislative intent
that a corresponding rule of law shall not be applicable. The
potency of this rule of negative implication is such that the Code
has specific provisions negating it in certain cases: "The omis-
sion from either Part 2 or Part 3 of this Article [Article 7] of a
provision corresponding to a provision made in the other Part
does not imply that a corresponding rule of law is not applica-
ble." 76 The Code section just quoted by its terms does not apply
to the relationship between § 3-417 and the corresponding § 4-207.
It might be argued that § 1-103, making applicable general prin-
ciples of law and equity unless displaced by the particular pro-
visions of this Act, forbids a negative implication. It does not for
at least three reasons. First, cases under provisions similar to
§ 1-103 have not prevented negative implications. These cases,
though not dispositive, represent persuasive authority. Second,
such an interpretation of § 1-103 would render surplusage § 7-105;
and finally, limiting the term "particular provisions" found in
§ 1-103 to express provisions would unduly and unwisely restrict
courts in interpreting the Act. It does not follow, however, that
because a negative inference is permissible, it is mandatory. The
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not decide
cases. 77 It is a rule of logic and is employed when there is a
basis for making the inference that a provision is exhaustive; but
it is disregarded when there is no such basis.78 Whether or not
there is such a basis depends on the legislative intent, to be de-
termined by considering the statute as a whole, together with its
legislative history and any other available aids. The maxim
should not be applied mechanically, and only a mechanical appli-
cation would reprive a warrantor under § 3-417 of a discharge to
the extent of any loss caused by warrantee's delay in making
claim.70 There is nothing in the Code as a whole depriving the
76 § 7-105. See also § 1-102(4), § 5-102(3).
77 See Llewellyn, supra n. 35.
78 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 4915-4917 (3rd ed. 1943).
79 Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934), the approach of which is
specifically endorsed by Comment 1, § 1-102, supports a rejection of nega-
tive implication and indeed development of a common law rule by analogy
to § 4-207. See also Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev.
383 at 385-86 (1908); Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 4 (1936). These articles suggest that legislation might be received
into the body of the law not only as a rule to be applied but as a principle
from which to reason.
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courts of the power to formulate rules respecting the shifting of
equities caused by delay. There is a certain lack of judicial sym-
pathy for the rule that presumes that unreasonable delay has
caused damage.80 Perhaps hostility against one who breaches a
warranty accounts for this. But once it is proved that unreason-
able delay has caused loss, judicial and legislative sympathy shift
in favor of the warrantor whose breach, after all, is without fault
in many instances. 81 A court might decide that in certain
instances involving bad faith on the part of the warrantor his
liability was not discharged. But any rule is intolerable which
forbids a court from deciding that liability for breach of a pre-
sentment warranty may never be discharged. A finding that the
legislatures, adopting the Code, intended such a rule should not
be left to inference.
We have already discussed the rule that mere negligence of
the holder in taking an instrument does not affect finality of pay-
ment under § 3-418. According to comment 4 to that section:
"If such negligence amounts to a lack of good faith as de-
fined in this Act (§ 1-201) or to notice under the rules(§ 3-304) relating to notice to a purchaser of an instrument,
the holder is not a holder in due course and is not protected;
but otherwise the holder's negligence does not affect the
finality of the payment or acceptance."
However, if a holder does not qualify for protection under
§ 3-418, negligence does affect finality of payment to him under
the common law of many jurisdictions,8 2 which, if the above
analysis of § 1-103 is correct, will continue to be the law when
neither § 3-417 (1) nor 3-418 apply. Is it possible that enactment
of the UCC may influence a change in this rule of common law?
Courts frequently develop common law by reasoning by analogy
from statutes, and the UCC drafters encourage courts to reason
from the Code's basic policies.8 3 There is case support suggesting
that courts will accept this encouragement.8 4 The following ex-
ample illustrates this problem: A holder takes an instrument in
good faith and for value, but notice is attributed to him because
he took the instrument more than 30 days8 5 after issue. Such
80 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S. Ct. 573 (1943).
81 Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1470 (1938).
82 Beutel, supra n. 50, § 62 at 915.
83 Supra n. 77.
84 Vitex Manufacturing Co. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967).
85 § 3-304(3) (c).
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holder was negligent in taking the instrument. According to
Britton,"' there is a conflict of authority on the question of
whether the drawee may recover the money paid out on a forged
bill or check from one who was negligent in his purchase of such
instrument. In jurisdictions which allow recovery, does the Code
alter the common law in any way? One of the policies of the
Code, as expressed in § 3-418, is that negligence will not defeat
finality of payment so long as such negligence is compatible with
holder-in-due-course status. Is it not arguable that the common
law of restitution should be modified by analogy and that only
negligence which is incompatible with holder-in-due-course status
should defeat finality of payment? This result would have at
least two beneficial results. It would promote uniformity by
harmonizing the applicable common law rules, and it would
eliminate in an important area the drastic difference in treatment
afforded those protected by § 3-418 and those not so protected.
Such difference in treatment is hard to justify in those instances
where lack of holder-in-due-course status is the product of a
technicality.
The Code provides that a transferee from a holder in due
course is vested with such rights as the holder in due course pos-
sesses."7 These rights include freedom from "all claims to the
instrument on the part of any person; and ... all defenses of any
party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt" 88
(subject to the exception of "real" defenses).89 It would seem
further that a transferee from a holder in due course is vested
with the rights granted a holder in due course by § 3-418. Doubt,
however, has been expressed whether a donee from a holder in
due course is protected by § 3-418. The genesis of this doubt is
uncertain. "Transfer" within the meaning of § 3-201 (1) includes
gift. When the Code drafters desired to limit legal benefits con-
ferred by § 3-201 to a "transferee for value," they so provided.90
Section 3-201, comment 2, is explicit that when an instrument is
transferred as a gift "the ;Ionee acquires whatever right the donor
had." What, then, is the basis of the doubt?
It springs from the different considerations relevant to (1)
86 Britton, supra n. 1, at 382.
87 § 3-201(1).
88 § 3-305.
89 Id. at (2) (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).
90 § 3-201(3).
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a determination whether a holder should take free of personal
defenses, the traditional area in which holder-in-due-course status
is granted; and (2) the considerations relevant to determining
whether payment is final. The policy of allowing a holder in due
course to take free of personal defenses is the stimulation of the
free flow of commercial paper. The equities of the parties dictate
the choice when the issue is finality of payment. Thus it is
argued that when § 3-418 makes payment final in favor of a
holder in due course, it is granting not the ordinary rights of a
holder in due course, but special rights and, it is argued further
these special rights are not among the rights granted by the
shelter provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. 91 It is argued
that since the holder in due course concept is inappropriate in the
context of finality of payment, its range of effect ought to be lim-
ited. The basic weakness of this argument is that the legislatures
adopting the UCC have rejected the argument that holder in due
course status is inappropriate, and it would be strange to attrib-
ute to the drafters of the Code the intent to reject the inappro-
priateness argument but accept the inferences to be drawn there-
from. It is interesting to note that a similar problem arises in
another connection.
Under § 3-305, to the extent that he is a holder in due course,
a holder takes the instrument free from all the defenses of any
parties to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt.
This language deprives payee-holders in due course, 92 who take
directly from the drawer, of the ordinary protection of a holder
in due course which § 3-305 affords. But clearly if he is a holder
in due course such a payee is protected under § 3-418.
A fundamental objection to the special rights argument is
revealed in an examination of the policy of § 3-201, which is to
assure holders in due course a free market for their paper,93 and
91 2 New York Law Revisions Commission Report, Study of the U.C.C. at
314. 315 [1076, 1077] (1955).
92 A payee may be a holder in due course (§ 3-302(2)) if he complies with
§ 3-302 (1).
93 Prof. Aigler characterized as extravagant the view of Poffenberger, J. in
Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S.E. 761(1909) that the lack of the rule in Price v. Neal "... would not only impede
commercial transactions, but also introduce unnecessary and grave elements
of uncertainty and danger, and render the whole commercial system un-
stable and treacherous as well as too slow to meet ordinary business de-
mands." Aigler, Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 809, 819 (1926).
It is difficult to believe that a prospective transferee, who is willing to take
the risk that the check may be dishonored, is not willing to take the risk
of a bank recovery, if, perchance the bank pays by mistake.
Spring, 1968
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more importantly, the policy of § 3-418, which is to make certain
business transactions final. The special rights argument is made
with respect to a donee from a holder in due course, but pre-
sumably if the argument is acceptable there, it will apply when
the transferee is a taker for value. The bases of this assumption
are: (1) the logic of the special rights argument applies with
equal force to those transferees for value who are holders not in
due course; and (2) the language of §§ 3-418 and 3-201 (1), taken
together, gives absolutely no support for a selective application
of the benefits afforded by § 3-418.
The policy of § 3-418 is to protect holders in due course. If
transferees from holders in due course are not given the pro-
tection of § 3-418, this policy is frustrated whenever the trans-
feree has an action over against the holder in due course, either
for breach of a transferor's warranty,94 or for breach of con-
tract915 if the instrument is transferred by endorsement. The
following example illustrates this point. A holder not in due
course takes an instrument under such circumstances that the
payor would have a right of action against such holder except
for the provisions of § 3-418. Such holder has not changed his
position in reliance on the payment. If we accept the special
rights argument, the transferee, now compelled to return the
payment, has a cause of action against the holder in due course
under many circumstances. For example, if the drawer's signa-
ture is a forgery, a cause of action exists under § 3-417 (2), which
provides that "any person who transfers an instrument and re-
ceives consideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer
is by endorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the instru-
ment in good faith that . . . (b) all signatures are genuine or
authorized." Under such circumstances the holder in due course
would ultimately have to pay. Does this not frustrate the policy
of § 3-418, which disallows direct suit against the holder in due
course? Examples could be multiplied. But what of the donee?
He does not receive the benefit of the transferor's warranties
under § 3-417 (2). But he does receive the benefits of the en-
dorser's engagements under § 3-414.96 A donee has no equities as
94 §3-417(2), § 4-207(2).
95 § 3-414(1).
96 Comment one states that the endorser's liability is incurred "whether or
not the endorser transferred the instrument for value or received consider-
ation for his endorsement."
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a donee. His equities are derivative. If the holder in due course
must ultimately bear the loss of allowing recovery, then the equi-
ties to be balanced are those of the payor and the holder in due
course, who as a practical matter would either be impleaded or,
if jurisdiction is lacking, vouched in. 9 7
In conclusion, although the use of the warranty doctrine in
the context of finality of payment has been severely criticized, 98
in most instances, the courts can probably balance the equities
fairly within the conceptual framework provided by the Code.
However, in some of the areas discussed legislative action may
be necessary.
97 § 3-803.
98 Britton, Defenses, Claims of Ownership and Equities, 7 Hastings L. J. 1,
at 40 and 41 (1955).
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